A Mathematical Commitment Without Computational Strength

Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):880-906 (2022)
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Abstract

We present a new manifestation of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem and discuss its foundational significance, in particular with respect to Hilbert’s program. Specifically, we consider a proper extension of Peano arithmetic ( $\mathbf {PA}$ ) by a mathematically meaningful axiom scheme that consists of $\Sigma ^0_2$ -sentences. These sentences assert that each computably enumerable ( $\Sigma ^0_1$ -definable without parameters) property of finite binary trees has a finite basis. Since this fact entails the existence of polynomial time algorithms, it is relevant for computer science. On a technical level, our axiom scheme is a variant of an independence result due to Harvey Friedman. At the same time, the meta-mathematical properties of our axiom scheme distinguish it from most known independence results: Due to its logical complexity, our axiom scheme does not add computational strength. The only known method to establish its independence relies on Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. In contrast, Gödel’s theorem is not needed for typical examples of $\Pi ^0_2$ -independence (such as the Paris–Harrington principle), since computational strength provides an extensional invariant on the level of $\Pi ^0_2$ -sentences.

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Finitism.W. W. Tait - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (9):524-546.
Reflection Principles and Their Use for Establishing the Complexity of Axiomatic Systems.Georg Kreisel & Azriel Lévy - 1968 - Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logic Und Grundlagen der Mathematik 14 (1):97--142.

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