Abstract

In this chapter I discuss Roger Trigg’s contribution to this volume on Wittgenstein, concepts, and human nature. Trigg shares many of the basic assumptions that form the methodological framework of cognitive science of religion (CSR) arguing that Wittgenstein’s later work shares common ground with presumptions, commitments, and accounts in cultural studies that are usually rejected by proponents of CSR. In particular, he challenges Wittgenstein’s notion of truth, that he sees under the threat of radical relativism. Against his view I argue that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy never comes at the cost of losing the notion of objective truth. It rather demands a change in the conceptual framework that underlies the use of this notion of truth. In the first section I argue for the claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s development. In the second section I explore the social nature of meaning in the Later Wittgenstein, arguing, in the third section, that it does not commit us to radical relativism. Finally, I draw some conclusions from my argument for the studies of CSR.