Practices and normativity: Philosophy of Science, Agency and Epistemic Normativity

Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana 45 (130) (2024)
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Abstract

The present work aims to present the notion of eidetic agency as a novel account for the understanding of an epistemic normativity based on practices. The eidetic agency (Fonseca, 2020) and (Fonseca, 2023) is a modality of material agency that, scaffolded and extensively, delegates epistemic agency to formal artifacts that become evident in the materiality of the signifiers of artificial languages. Such eidetic artifacts constitute an epistemic normativity that, although it is based on implicit practices and norms of scientific practices, overcome certain problems derived from that reading. The first section of the text presents a definition and general analysis of the project of a normative epistemology based on practices. In the second part, the relationship between practices in science and scientific regulations is deeply analyzed, based on the premises of Martínez and Huang (2011). Finally, a possible solution to the theoretical problems derived from such reading is proposed, with the approach of an epistemic normativity based on eidetic agents.

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Miguel Fonseca
Florida International University

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