An algebraic approach to belief contraction and nonmonotonic entailment

Journal of Applied Logic 5 (3):478-491 (2007)
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10.1016/j.jal.2006.03.006

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A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change.Alexander Bochman - 2000 - Artificial Intelligence 116 (1-2):237-263.
A power algebra for theory change.K. Britz - 1999 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):429-443.

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