Morally responsible people without freedom

In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this brief concluding chapter we first wish to present the overall argument of the book in a concise, nontechnical way. We hope this will provide a clear view of the argument. We shall then point to some of the distinctive--and attractive--features of our approach. Finally, we shall offer some preliminary thoughts about extending the account of moral responsibility to apply to emotions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How to be responsible for something without causing it.Carolina Sartorio - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336.
My way: essays on moral responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):101-111.
A problem for guidance control.Patrick Todd & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):685-692.
Moral responsibility for harm caused by computer system failures.Douglas Birsch - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (4):233-245.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
242 (#84,141)

6 months
16 (#158,921)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Fischer
University of California, Riverside

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references