Wittgenstein on rules and platonism

In Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein. Routledge. pp. 83-100 (2000)
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David Finkelstein
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Wittgenstein, Theories of Meaning, and Linguistic Disjunctivism.Silver Bronzo - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1340-1363.
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Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.Daniel Watts - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1159-1185.
Why avowals must be assertions.Ning Fan - 2023 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (2):221-239.

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