Post-Enquiry and Disagreement. A Socio-Epistemological Model of the Normative Significance of Disagreement Between Scientists and Denialists

Social Epistemology 37 (2):177-196 (2023)
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Abstract

In this paper we investigate whether and to what extent scientists (e.g. inquirers such as epidemiologists or virologists) can have rational and fruitful disagreement with what we call post-enquirers (e.g. conspiratorial anti-vaxxers) on topics of scientific relevance such as the safety and efficacy of vaccines. In order to accomplish this aim, we will rely and expand on the epistemological framework developed in detail in Ferrari & Moruzzi (2021) to study the underlying normative profile of enquiry and post-enquiry. We take it that our analysis provides an effective explanation of why standard argumentative strategies such as fact-checking and debunking cannot work in the context of disagreement between scientists and denialists unless they are coupled with a discussion of the values that are endorsed by the scientific community.

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Author Profiles

Filippo Ferrari
University of Bologna
Sebastiano Moruzzi
University of Bologna

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Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity.Sanford Goldberg (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Echoes of covid misinformation.Neil Levy - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (5):931-948.

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