Are Functional Accounts of Goodness Relativist?

Reason Papers 19:109-117 (1994)
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Abstract

The short answer, which will no doubt frustrate those who read to find the short answer, is yes and no. Yes in respect of the fact that all agents are not the same and so what is good for one agent may be different from what is good for another agent. No in respect of the fact that normativity, or standards which range over agents relevantly similar, is still quite present. The point of this paper will be to unpack this position.

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