Leibniz’s Commitment to Monism

Idealistic Studies 3 (1):18-31 (1973)
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Abstract

Russell claimed that one of Leibniz’s theses about the nature of propositions was inconsistent with his pluralism. Russell felt that one cannot consistently maintain both that every proposition ascribes a predicate to a subject, and that there are many, independent, real entities, or “substances.” Leibniz seems to have maintained both of these views.

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