Establishing the accuracy of self-diagnosis in psychiatry

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Self-diagnosis in psychiatry is where individuals diagnose themselves rather than rely upon official diagnosticians to supply a psychiatric diagnosis. The accuracy of self-diagnosis is a contested topic. In this paper, I outline what arguments are needed to see self-diagnosis as accurate and how different approaches to self-diagnosis require different arguments. I show how different arguments are required to justify accuracy for an autistic individual judging they are autistic compared to non-autistic individuals judging they are not autistic. Different arguments are required if a self-diagnosing individual accepts or rejects official diagnostic criteria. Finally, different arguments are required depending upon whether diagnoses are seen as objective entities, the product of theoretical virtues or practically useful groupings. All these approaches require unique arguments to justify the accuracy of self-diagnosis. Identifying the required arguments for different approaches is a stepping stone toward establishing whether those arguments and which of those arguments can be successfully justified.

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References found in this work

Kinds of kinds: A conceptual taxonomy of psychiatric categories.Nick Haslam - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):203-217.
Participatory Interactive Objectivity in Psychiatry.Şerife Tekin - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (5):1166-1175.
The Value of Categorical Polythetic Diagnoses in Psychiatry.Sam Fellowes - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4):941-963.
The ethics of autism.Kristien Hens, Ingrid Robeyns & Katrien Schaubroeck - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 14 (1):e12559.

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