Integrating the Care and Justice Perspectives: A Contribution to the Feminist Ethic of Carol Gilligan
Dissertation, The University of Connecticut (
1993)
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Abstract
The distinction Carol Gilligan develops between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice has generated intense discussion. My contribution to this discussion is twofold. ;First, I clarify the two moral perspectives. As I interpret them, an ethic of care and an ethic of justice differ in two fundamental ways. The two fundamental differences are that between care and respect and that between attachment and equality. Those who practice an ethic of care allow care to be the most central attitude in their moral lives and believe that some moral patients exert a greater ethical pull on the moral agent than do other moral patients. In contrast, those who practice an ethic of justice allow respect to be the most central attitude in their moral lives and believe that all moral patients exert an equal ethical pull on the moral agent. After explaining in detail what the two fundamental differences are, I investigate whether, from these two fundamental differences, any further significant differences can be derived. In particular, I evaluate three frequently advanced contrasts: whereas an ethic of justice is a principled ethic, an ethic of care is not; the solutions to moral problems reachable from an ethic of justice sometimes conflict with the solutions to moral problems reachable from an ethic of care; whereas an ethic of justice is more widely applicable within the public domain of human activity, an ethic of care is more widely applicable within the private domain. ;Second, I establish the logical and psychological possibility of five integrations of the two moral perspectives. The five integrations are the Care-Respect Integration, the Care-Equality Integration, the Respect-Attachment Integration, the Moral Domains Integration, and the Moral Problems Integration. I conclude by considering whether these integrations generate adequate moral personalities