Abstract
Fitzpatrick’s writing on international law did not constitute the main focus of his oeuvre. However, the determinate-responsive nature of law that characterised so much of his work did extend to an analysis of the generative force of international law. This article picks up on commentary from Modernism and the Grounds of Law (2001) and ‘Latin Roots’ (2010), among other contributions, to test this generative force of international law, which Fitzpatrick identifies as a necessary affirmation of the movement between the ‘determinate but not ultimately determinate’ sovereignty of a singular nation state and the ‘illimitably responsive but not ultimately responsive’ force of the community (Fitzpatrick 2010, p. 46). We test Fitzpatrick’s view of international law through two examples of un-recognised states and the mechanism of non/recognition utilised by the international legal community to determine what constitutes a singular nation-state for participation in the community of international law. Our two case studies, North Cyprus and Crimea, illuminate the continuing relevance of Fitzpatrick’s schema. Through non/recognition, ‘states’ that are included-as-excluded participate in the ongoing affirmation of an international legal ‘community’, a community that continues to be constituted through the affirmation of imperial power.