Freedom as Non-Domination or How to Throw the Agent Out of the Space of Reasons
Abstract
This paper analyzes agency in Pettit’s republican conception of freedom. By
understanding freedom intersubjectively in terms of agency, Pettit makes an
important contribution to the contemporary debate on negative liberty. At the same
time, some of the presumptions about agency are problematic. The paper defends
the thesis that Pettit is not able to provide the sufficient conditions for freedom as
non-domination that he sets out to do. In order to show why this is the case and
how we can address this shortcoming, a distinction is introduced between a thick
and a thin intersubjective account of agency. It is argued that while Pettit’s
freedom presupposes a thin account, he would need a thick account in order to
elaborate not only the necessary but also the sufficient conditions of freedom as
non-domination.