Abstract

The aim of this study is to interpret and discuss the investigations of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein into the concepts and phenomena of perception and language. The study consists of two major divisions in which the writings of both thinkers are interpreted in terms of the thesis that perception and language, seeing and speaking, are contextual affairs, events, and practices. The demonstration of this thesis is carried out by way of the critique by Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein of empiricist and rationalist conceptions of perception and language. With respect to perception, the traditional concepts of sensation, sense impression, association, memory, attention, judgment, and interpretation are shown to be problematic and untenable given that perceiving--specifically seeing--does not consist of a discrete and simple act or experience. Perceptual experience instead takes place within already meaningful and structured fields and contexts. The traditional conception of language as the external representation of thought and of linguistic meaning as something distinct from the expressions of a language is criticized in terms of Merleau-Ponty's and Wittgenstein's descriptions of the social frameworks of speech. These frameworks consist of language as the collection of sedimented meanings which have become established within the institutions, language-games, and forms of life of a community and society. Speaking, like perceiving, always takes place within a meaningful context and situation