Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas

Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):127 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors. The pay-offs to the row player are as follows

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,758

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
26 (#626,984)

6 months
1 (#1,507,095)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Modelling reciprocal altruism.Christopher Stephens - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):533-551.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mysticism and logic.Bertrand Russell - 1917 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
Mysticism and Logic.Bertrand Russell - 1914 - Hibbert Journal 12:780-803.

Add more references