Running up the flagpole to see if anyone salutes: A response to Woodward on causal and explanatory asymmetries

Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Does smoke cause fire or does fire cause smoke? James Woodward’s “Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries” argues that various statistical independence relations not only help us to uncover the directions of causal and explanatory relations in our world, but also are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions. We raise questions about Woodward’s envisioned epistemology, but our primary focus is on his metaphysics. We argue that any alleged connection between statistical (in)dependence and causal/explanatory direction is contingent, at best. The directions of causal/explanatory relations in our world seem not to depend on the statistical (in)dependence relations in our world (conceived of either as frequency patterns or as relations among chances). Thus, we doubt that statistical (in)dependence relations are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Causal Relations and Explanatory Strategies in Physics.Andrew Wayne - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):75-89.
Hypothetical Interventions and Belief Changes.Holger Andreas & Lorenzo Casini - 2019 - Foundations of Science 24 (4):681-704.
Explanatory Asymmetries: Laws of Nature Rehabilitated.Lina Jansson - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (11):577-599.
Symmetries and Explanatory Dependencies in Physics.Steven French & Juha Saatsi - 2018 - In Alexander Reutlinger & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 185-205.
Causal and Explanatory Asymmetry.Daniel M. Hausman - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (Volume One: Contributed Papers):43 - 54.
Causal Explanatory Power.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1029-1050.
Explanatory Abstractions.Lina Jansson & Juha Saatsi - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):817–844.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-05-06

Downloads
249 (#80,454)

6 months
87 (#54,151)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katrina Elliott
University of California, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world.Philip Kitcher - 1989 - In Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 410-505.
Causal relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
Venetian sea levels, british bread prices, and the principle of the common cause.Elliott Sober - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):331-346.

View all 7 references / Add more references