How Downwards Causation Occurs in Digital Computers

Foundations of Physics 49 (11):1253-1277 (2019)
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Abstract

Digital computers carry out algorithms coded in high level programs. These abstract entities determine what happens at the physical level: they control whether electrons flow through specific transistors at specific times or not, entailing downward causation in both the logical and implementation hierarchies. This paper explores how this is possible in the light of the alleged causal completeness of physics at the bottom level, and highlights the mechanism that enables strong emergence to occur. Although synchronic emergence of higher levels from lower levels is manifestly true, diachronic emergence is generically not the case; indeed we give specific examples where it cannot occur because of the causal effectiveness of higher level variables.

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Author Profiles

George Ellis
Cambridge University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Emergence of Time.George F. R. Ellis & Barbara Drossel - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (3):161-190.
The Causal Closure of Physics in Real World Contexts.George F. R. Ellis - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (10):1057-1097.
Emergence in Solid State Physics and Biology.George F. R. Ellis - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (10):1098-1139.
Physical Time and Human Time.George F. R. Ellis - 2023 - Foundations of Physics 54 (1):1-17.
Top-Down Causation Without Levels.Jan Voosholz - 2021 - In Jan Voosholz & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Top-Down Causation and Emergence. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 269-296.

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References found in this work

Design for a Brain.W. Ross Ashby - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (14):169-173.
More is different.P. W. Anderson - 1994 - In H. Gutfreund & G. Toulouse (eds.), Biology and Computation: A Physicist's Choice. World Scientific. pp. 3--21.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Counterfactual theories of causation.Peter Menzies - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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