Secondary Qualities and Self-Location

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer-independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less-than-fully-real, subjective, observer-dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling-out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thingto get.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,829

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sensory qualities, sensible qualities, sensational qualities.Alex Byrne - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Are colors secondary qualities?Alex Byrne & David Hilbert - 2011 - In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Sounds and temporality.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:303-320.
A Theory of Secondary Qualities.Robert Pasnau - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):568-591.
The nature of noise.John Kulvicki - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-16.
What’s That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
276 (#73,449)

6 months
32 (#104,121)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andy Egan
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Myth of the De Se.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.
The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
De se attitudes: Ascription and communication.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
What Are Centered Worlds?Shen-yi Liao - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.

View all 53 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references