In Favour of Mereological Nominalism: reply to Cumpa and Declos

Philosophia 50 (4):1707-1719 (2022)
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Abstract

Mereological nominalism is the thesis that properties are identical to mereological fusions of their instances. Cumpa and Declos have raised two problems for the view. This paper is a reply to both problems.

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Nikk Effingham
University of Birmingham

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References found in this work

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Possible Worlds.John Divers - 2002 - Routledge.
Towards a Theory of Part.Kit Fine - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):559-589.
Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk.Theodore Sider - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):285 - 289.
Against structural universals.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.

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