El quietismo de Wittgenstein y seguir una regla como disposiciones

Anuario Filosófico 28 (2):377-394 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper examines one of the problem raised by Wittgenstein's discus-sion of rule-following. What is it to grasp a rule (a universal, a pro-perty) given that a rule is individuated by its application to objects which the grasper will never think of? One philosophically tempting solution to this problem is discussed. To grasp a rule is to be disposed to behave in certain ways. The paper shows how this answer resurrects the very problem it was designed to solve and concludes by relating this dia-lectic to Wittgenstein's Quietism

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,758

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Wittgenstein, McDowell y el reto escéptico.María Teresa Muñoz Sánchez - 2013 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 38 (2):7-34.
Seguir una regla y conocimiento práctico.Carlos Rodríguez Lluesma - 1995 - Anuario Filosófico 28 (2):395-410.
This is Simply What I Do.Catherine Legg - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):58–80.
Wittgenstein’s Paradox of Ordinary Language.Barry Stocker - 2000 - Essays in Philosophy 1 (2):1-14.
Non-cognitivism and rule-following.John McDowell - 1981 - In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Boston: Routledge. pp. 141--62.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-09

Downloads
2 (#1,814,705)

6 months
1 (#1,507,095)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references