'What-for' Questions and the Use of Sentences

Analysis 17 (4):87 (1956)
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Abstract

The author discusses the argument between alan r white and gilbert ryle concerning whether or not one can talk of the use of a sentence. His contention is that they did not notice that there are two types of 'what for' questions, And therefore white's argument against ryle does not hold. (staff)

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