Abstract

Available evidence suggests that pedagogical practices in some religious schools in America are harmful to children. They excessively restrict students' liberties, thwart intellectual autonomy; foster intolerance and an inability to interact constructively with persons holding different conceptions of the good; and cause diminished self-respect and severe anxiety. This Dissertation considers from a liberal perspective what state policy should be toward such schools if they do in fact harm children in these ways. ;After summarizing research on Fundamentalist Christian and Catholic schooling, the Dissertation describes the prevailing approach of courts, legislators, and academics to addressing parent-state conflicts over regulation of religious schools. They attribute to parents a fundamental right to control their children's education, and balance this right against state interests. The Dissertation demonstrates that the very concept of parental rights is illegitimate. Rights to control another person's life are anomalous within our legal and moral culture, and standard justifications for giving parents such rights, including justifications based on children's interests, cannot withstand scrutiny. It also explains why liberal values of state neutrality and toleration with respect to religious belief do not support state deference to parents' child-rearing preferences. ;The Dissertation next critiques an alternative approach that treats children's education as a protected means for religious communities to preserve their culture. Arguments for giving special rights to cultural minorities, based on values of equality or freedom of association, cannot support a community right to control children's up-bringing. Applying to the situation of children themselves the values underlying these arguments actually yields support for increased state intervention into culture-transmitting practices of some minority communities. ;Finally, the Dissertation endorses a justice-based approach that gives equal consideration to the distinct interests of children. It modifies and applies John Rawls' political conception of justice, demonstrating that application of its basic principles to children's education yields requirements for substantial state regulation and oversight of religious schools. Insofar as these conclusions are inconsistent with Rawls's recent statements concerning education and respect for persons holding non-liberal conceptions of the good, this analysis generates criticism of his latest work.