Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge

Grazer Philosophische Studien 7 (1):253-269 (1979)
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Abstract

Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint.

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Fred Dretske
Last affiliation: Duke University

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