On Bradley’s preservation condition for conditionals

Erkenntnis 67 (1):111 - 118 (2007)
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Abstract

Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.

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Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

Harms and objections.Michael McDermott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):436-448.
Against Preservation.Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):424-436.

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References found in this work

Logic and Conversation.H. P. Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (eds.), The Logic of Grammar. Encino, CA: pp. 64-75.
What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.

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