Understanding Others: Cultural Anthropology with Collingwood and Quine

Journal of the Philosophy of History 7 (3):326-345 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

On one meaning of the term “historicism” to be a historicist is to be committed to the claim that the human sciences have a methodology of their own that is distinct in kind and not only in degree from that of the natural sciences. In this sense of the term Collingwood certainly was a historicist, for he defended the view that history is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive method and subject matter against the claim for methodological unity in the sciences. On another interpretation historicism is a relativist way of thinking which denies the possibility of universal and fundamental interpretations of historical or cultural phenomena. In the following I argue that at least in this second sense of “historicism” Collingwood was everything but a historicist. Quine, on the contrary, was nothing but a historicist. The goal of the comparison, however, is not to establish just who, on this definition, was or was not a historicist, but to draw a few conclusions about what a commitment to or rejection of historicism in this sense, tells us about the nature of understanding

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The vicissitude of completeness: Gadamer's criticism of Collingwood.Dimitrios Vardoulakis - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (1):3 – 19.
Distinguishing WV Quine and Donald Davidson.James Pearson - 2011 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (1):1-22.
Collingwood and Weber vs. Mink: History after the Cognitive Turn.Stephen Turner - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):230-260.
Re-enacting in the Second Person.Karim Dharamsi - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):163-178.
The 'object' of historical knowledge.Patrick Gardiner - 1952 - Philosophy 27 (102):211-220.
A Just Medium: Empathy and Detachment in Historical Understanding.Constantine Sandis - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):179-200.
Historicism and Philosophy: Reflections on R. G. Collingwood.N. Rotenstreich - 1957 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11 (4):401-419.
On the Concept of “Radical Understanding”.Gaetano Chiurazzi - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 21:25-30.
The philosophy of enchantment: studies in folktale, cultural criticism, and anthropology.R. G. Collingwood - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by David Boucher, Wendy James & Philip Smallwood.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-09

Downloads
27 (#590,878)

6 months
4 (#794,133)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard van Orman Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Indeterminacy of Translation.Alan Weir - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.

Add more references