The Basic Minimum: A Welfarist Approach

New York: Cambridge University Press (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A common presupposition in contemporary moral and political philosophy is that individuals should be provided with some basic threshold of goods, capabilities, or well-being. But if there is such a basic minimum, how should this be understood? Dale Dorsey offers an underexplored answer: that the basic minimum should be characterized not as the achievement of a set of capabilities, or as access to some specified bundle of resources, but as the maintenance of a minimal threshold of human welfare. In addition, Dorsey argues that though political institutions should be committed to the promotion of this minimal threshold, we should reject approaches that seek to cast the basic minimum as a human right. His book will be important for all who are interested in theories of political morality.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-11-24

Downloads
37 (#444,147)

6 months
5 (#710,905)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas

Citations of this work

Good Enough? The Minimally Good Life Account of the Basic Minimum.Nicole Hassoun - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):330-341.
Equality-tempered prioritarianism.Dale Dorsey - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):45-61.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references