Abstract

This century has witnessed a surge in philosophical interest on the issue of feelings and their role in human experience, both intellectual and ethical. One philosopher and theologian for whom feelings gradually became a central facet of his understanding of human ethical intentionality was Bernard Lonergan, S.J. In his text Method in Theology and later essays, Lonergan begins to set out the fruit of the appropriation of his own affective life. However, he made only a beginning. It is the incomplete nature of his investigation of the role of feelings in ethical intentionality which prompts this dissertation. This dissertation attempts to complement Lonergan's work by wondering about the meaning behind his brief words about feelings. ;The first chapter is an examination of Lonergan's principle text, Insight. It will be argued that a certain ambiguity arises in Lonergan's estimation of the affective life. This ambiguity is resolved in Lonergan's later work on feelings. ;Chapter Two explores the work of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, two phenomenologists from whom Lonergan claims to have received inspiration for his reflections on feelings. This exploration includes a criticism of their positions in order to clarity what Lonergan borowed from these thinkers and what he found unacceptable. ;Chapters Three, Four and Five attempt a more thorough analysis of ethical intentionality and the role of feelings than Lonergan himself offered in his texts. Chapter Three discusses Lonergan's typology of feelings, including the notion of an "intentional response", namely the distinction of "value". Chapter Five explores the role of feelings in the process of deliberation, suggesting two specific tasks which feelings fulfill. First, feelings are elements in the existential horizon within which the deliberative process occurs. Second, there are feelings which simulataneously operate in such a way that the subject apprehends the possibility of moral self-transcendence, that is, the possibility of acting beyond the confines of one's existential horizon