The Problem of Free Choice of Will in the Thought of Augustine, John Cassian, and Faustus of Riez
Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada) (
1988)
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Abstract
This inquiry focuses on the problem of human freedom in the thought of Augustine and two of his early critics, John Cassian and Faustus of Riez. Two issues are of primary importance: the issue concerning the nature of free choice of will, and the issue concerning how free choice of will is to be reconciled with divine election. These issues arise as a result of a change that occurred in Augustine's thinking on human freedom in 396, the year that he grasped the true significance of Paul's doctrine of divine election. To Augustine that doctrine entailed that the will's movement towards the Good was only possible if divine Good Itself worked within the fallen will to make it good. Cassian and Faustus, however, questioned how Augustine could affirm the reality of free choice of will when he insisted that the fallen moral agent lacked the natural ability to do good. ;In order to come to terms with this dilemma, this inquiry views Augustine's later doctrine of human freedom as a form of classical Christian compatibilism. Beginning with H. A. Wolfson's observation that in the Pelagian Controversy Augustine Christianized the pagan Stoic doctrine of fate, the study seeks to develop the implications of this observation in the context of the semi-Augustinian Controversy . Thus it attempts to carry out a task that Wolfson himself had intended to undertake but had never in fact been able to accomplish. ;In keeping with this objective, the inquiry develops Wolfson's claim by situating Augustine's response to the semi-Augustinians against the background of two key texts: Cicero's De fato and Augustine's De civitate dei . A careful study of these texts indicates not only a remarkable similarity between Chrysippus' and Augustine's solution to the problem of human freedom but also Augustine's own awareness of his indebtedness to the Stoics. With this background in mind, the inquiry proceeds, initially, to unravel Augustine's doctrine of human freedom and, subsequently, to view it in relation to Cassian's and Faustus' doctrine of human freedom. After drawing out the implications of these three doctrines of human freedom, a concluding chapter calls attention to the fact that Stoicism exerted a much more pervasive influence on the development of Augustine's doctrine of human freedom than has hitherto been suspected