Free choice and contextually permitted actions

Studia Logica 57 (1):193 - 220 (1996)
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Abstract

We present a solution to the paradox of free choice permission by introducing strong and weak permission in a deontic logic of action. It is shown how counterintuitive consequences of strong permission can be avoided by limiting the contexts in which an action can be performed. This is done by introducing the only operator, which allows us to say that only is performed (and nothing else), and by introducing contextual interpretation of action terms.

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Citations of this work

Basic Action Deontic Logic.Alessandro Giordani & Ilaria Canavotto - 2016 - In Olivier Roy, Allard Tamminga & Malte Willer (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 80-92.
Knowledge-driven versus data-driven logics.Didier Dubois, Petr Hájek & Henri Prade - 2000 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (1):65--89.
Imperatives: a Judgemental Analysis.Chris Fox - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (4):879-905.

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References found in this work

Deontic logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.
I. deontic logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.
IV*—Free Choice Permission.Hans Kamp - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1):57-74.
Logic, Language, and Meaning, Volume 1: Introduction to Logic.L. T. F. Gamut - 1990 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.

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