Computationalism

Social Epistemology 4 (2):135-154 (1990)
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Abstract

This paper argues for a noncognitiveist computationalism in the philosophy of mind. It further argues that both humans and computers have intentionality, that is, their mental states are semantical -- they are about things in their worlds.

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Author's Profile

Eric Dietrich
State University of New York at Binghamton

References found in this work

On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.
Minds, machines and Searle.Stevan Harnad - 1989 - Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 1:5-25.

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