Fifty Shades of Affective Colouring of Perception

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):1-15 (2023)
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Abstract

Recent evidence in cognitive neuroscience indicates that the visual system is influenced by the outcome of an early appraisal mechanism that automatically evaluates what is seen as being harmful or beneficial for the organism. This indicates that there could be valence in perception. But what could it mean for one to see something positively or negatively? Although most theories of emotions accept that valence involves being related to values, the nature of this relation remains highly debated. Some explain valence in terms of evaluative content, others in terms of evaluative attitude. Here I shall argue that an account of affective perception in terms of attitude has more chance of succeeding. To do so, I will first highlight the difficulties that a content-based approach faces, considering the many forms that it might take. I will conclude that seeing the world positively or negatively involves more than a positive or negative content; it involves a distinctive attitude, but which one? Should it be conceived of in imperative or evaluative terms? And what makes this attitude distinct from a proper emotion?

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Citations of this work

Modal Idealism.David Builes - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
Representationalism and Olfactory Valence.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.

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References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
Moral Perception.Robert Audi - 2013 - Princeton University Press.
What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.

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