Completeness and Indeterministic Causation

Philosophy of Science 63 (5):S177-S184 (1996)
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Abstract

In The Chances of Explanation, Paul Humphreys presents a metaphysical analysis of causation. In this paper, I argue that this analysis is flawed. Humphreys' model of Causality incorporates three completeness requirements. I show that these completeness requirements, when applied in the world, force us to take causally irrelevant factors to be causally relevant. On this basis, I argue that Humphreys' analysis should be rejected.

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