Simple 'might's, indicative possibilities and the open future

Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):67-82 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

are ambiguous. In the mouth of someone who cannot remember whether it was Michael, or rather someone else, who was top scorer, can express the epistemic possibility that Michael led the league in scoring. But from someone who knows that Michael did not even play last season, but is wondering what would have happened if he had, means something quite different. Now where it has this quite different meaning, may still turn out to be the expression of some epistemic possibility. Perhaps where does not express the epistemic possibility of ‘Michael led the league in scoring’, it expresses the epistemic possibility of ‘Michael would have led the league in scoring’. Analysis of this ‘would have’ statement, together with an exploration of the suspicion that the ‘might have’ statement is ambiguous between these two epistemic possibilities, will have to await another occasion. The important point for present purposes is that is ambiguous between an expression of the epistemic possibility of ‘Michael led the league in scoring’ and some quite different reading

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,783

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How Bad Is Rape?H. E. Baber - 1987 - Hypatia 2 (2):125-138.
The Hiddenness Argument Revisited.J. L. Schellenberg - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (3):287-303.
Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents.Peter J. Taylor - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304-310.
The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism.Tang Yijie & Yan Xin - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (4):477-501.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
154 (#122,876)

6 months
13 (#192,902)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Keith DeRose
Yale University

Citations of this work

Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.
Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.
Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals.Charity Anderson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

View all 13 references / Add more references