Abstract

We all know of course more or less what the answer of the historian would be if we turned to him alone for enlightenment. He would, to be sure, begin by pointing out that throughout Western history the two notions of legality and legitimacy have played an important part in political thought, providing as it were two of its most solid pillars. Without reaching as far back as the Greeks, the historian would probably recall to our attention the distinction, current in Medieval and Renaissance thought, between the two criteria for establishing the rightfulness of political power. Power, in order to be "just," must be both legitimate and law-abiding. Accordingly, the unjust ruler or tyrant may be defined ex parte exercitii as well as ex defectu tituli. His rule can be unjust for the manner in which it is exercised, if he does not keep within the bounds of legality. But it can also be unjust, and is inevitably so, if it lacks that proper "title" which confers legitimacy upon it. The quest for that title, namely for the ultimate foundation of authority, has long been the main concern of political theory. Some among us are old enough to remember the time when dynastic legitimacy was still an accepted doctrine in Europe. In our day, legitimacy is rarely invoked, and does not seem to be any longer an intelligible political principle. Yet there is still one European statesman who does not hesitate to use it as a prop for his political doctrine, if he has any. Shortly after his accession to power, President de Gaulle made the startling claim that "for twenty years" he had been "the incarnation of national legitimacy." Some of his recent actions seem clearly to evince the view which he once candidly expounded to an American visitor: that "legitimacy does not depend on legality, and legality is not necessarily a proof of legitimacy."