Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to reassess the debate between Boehner and Karger about Ockham’s views on the infallibility of intuitive cognition, and to present a new account of infallible intuitive cognition. After a detailed overview of Ockham’s theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition, the Boehner/Karger debate is examined. At the center of this debate are two conflicting interpretations of a certain passage in Ockham’s writings. It is shown that neither of these interpretations is ultimately successful. Next, a third interpretation is introduced and shown to be superior to the previous two. This new interpretation leads to a refutation of one of Karger’s main arguments against Boehner’s theory of the infallibility of intuitive cognition. Finally, a distinction between weak and strong infallibility is introduced, and it is argued that intuitive cognition is always weakly infallible, and often also strongly infallible.