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Parallel belief revision: Revising by sets of formulas
Artificial Intelligence 176 (1):2223-2245 (2012)
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Citations of this work
On the expressivity of inconsistency measures.Matthias Thimm - 2016 - Artificial Intelligence 234 (C):120-151.
Belief revision and projection in the epistemic situation calculus.Christoph Schwering, Gerhard Lakemeyer & Maurice Pagnucco - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 251 (C):62-97.
Belief base contraction by belief accrual.Cristhian A. D. Deagustini, M. Vanina Martinez, Marcelo A. Falappa & Guillermo R. Simari - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence 275 (C):78-103.
References found in this work
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics.Sarit Kraus, Daniel Lehmann & Menachem Magidor - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 44 (1-2):167-207.
What does a conditional knowledge base entail?Daniel Lehmann & Menachem Magidor - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 55 (1):1-60.
On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
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