La distinción analítico/sintético en el argumento de René Descartes contra la idea de Espacio

Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 35 (1):77-108 (2018)
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Abstract

Acquaintance with the name of argument against the vacuum, the present syllogism in René Descartes’ The Principles of Philosophy of 1644 must be extended to any form of continuum space. This article studies it from the point of view of Logic, with the purpose of revealing its petitio principii in relation with the analytical judgments. Hereby, as a result of review the foremost historic sources from where Kant obtains his famous division of the judgments in analytical and synthetic, we will be able to understand the best method to discern about them and to demonstrate the subdivision that we need to establish inside the analytical judgments.

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