Why Epistemology Is Not Ancient

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2):181-190 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper traces the significance of first principles in Greek philosophy to cognitive developments in colonial Greek Italy in the late fifth century BC. Conviction concerning principles comes from the power to make something true by action. Pairing and opposition, the forerunners of metonymy, are shown to structure disparate cultural phenomena—the making of figured numbers, the sundial, and the production, with the aid of device, of fear or panic in the spectators of Greek tragedy. From these starting points, the function of the gnômôn in knowledge is explored.

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Jean De Groot
Catholic University of America

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