Nota sobre "El conocimiento de sí en Leonardo Polo: un estudio del hábito de sabiduría"

Studia Poliana 11:201-209 (2009)
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Abstract

In Luca Fantini’s doctoral dissertation, a central question is introduced in reference to actual theories of identity. Many modern and posmodern philosophers introduce a division between objectivity and subjectivity conceiving the human subject in a partial way. Modern subjective philosophy fails because it is made in symmetry with metaphysics. Fantini asks if it is possible to understand the modern subject in another way. He asks is Aquinas is a valid answer today, after modernity. He proposes Polo as a contemporary philosopher that examines this questions in a radical way. Polo accepts traditional anthropology but proposes his transcendental anthropology as innovative pretending to improve our understanding of personal being. Classic philosophy is thus enlarged and modern philosophy rectified. Polo offers a new method: the abandonment of mental limit, that consists in amplifying classical metaphysics with a transcendental anthropology. Fantini offers with this an important contribution to the diffusion of this method

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