Abstract

This paper will evaluate whether Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics points towards a plausible account of friendship. We shall evaluate Whiting’s claim that Aristotle provides us with a model of how friendship should be and is at its best, even if most friendships do not live up to this. Whiting’s view centres on a view of friendship as grounded on mutual admiration of ethical character. Whilst there is appeal in the idea, stressed by Whiting, that friendship is grounded upon a kind of impersonal admiration, Aristotelian metaphysics restricts us to a single vision of the human good and prevents us from admiring different people in different ways. It will be argued that supplementation with a more pluralistic notion of human nature can help to bolster the account. Following Telfer , it shall further be argued that the grounds of a friendship must be seen to include elements of a sharing of perspectives and not be limited to mutual admiration of character. Whilst Telfer’s criticism does expose a blindspot in Aristotle, it will be argued that it is a criticism which an Aristotelian account can deal with