Davidson's Conceptual Argument for Rational Cognition: Wayne A. Davis

Legal Theory 3 (2):205-210 (1997)
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Abstract

According to Jules Coleman, Rational Choice Theory holds that human action is both intentional and rational. “The rationality of intentional action is evaluated along the two dimensions corresponding to the two elements of the belief-desire model.” On the belief-dimension, RC Theory assumes that people are “able to draw appropriate inferences from the information they possess.”

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Wayne Davis
Georgetown University

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