A Causal Theory of Experiential Fear

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):459 - 483 (1988)
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Abstract

There is a distinction between being afraid and being afraid that something is the case. Kathy may be afraid that it will rain without being afraid, and may be afraid without being afraid that it will rain. We shall say that the distinction is between experiential and propositional fear. To be afraid is to experience fear, to be in a state of fear. The state takes many forms, such as fright, terror, and dread. To be afraid that something is the case is to have a certain propositional attitude. We may have reasons for fearing, or being fearful, that it is. My goal is to explain what it means to experience fear. I shall argue that experiential fear can be defined in terms of propositional fear. The basic idea is that fear is experienced when an occurrent propositional fear of harm causes involuntary arousal and unhappiness in a direct way. The degree of fear experienced is the extent of involuntary arousal attributable to the subject's propositional fear. We shall see how this definition accounts for the similarities and differences between fear and the related concepts of hope and anxiety.

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Citations of this work

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Explaining emotions.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (March):139-161.
A theory of emotion.Joel Marks - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (1):227-242.

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