Indeterminate perception and colour relationism

Analysis 79 (1):25-34 (2019)
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Abstract

One of the most important objections to sense data theory comes from the phenomenon of indeterminate perception, as when an object in the periphery of one’s visual field looks red without looking to have any determinate shade of red. As sense data are supposed to have precisely the properties that sensibly appear to us, sense data theory evidently has the implausible consequence that a sense datum can have a determinable property without having any of its determinates. In this article, I show that a parallel objection applies to standard forms of colour relationism. In light of the phenomenon of indeterminate perception, the colour relationist must either reject intuitively obvious claims about the determinate–determinable structure of colour space or reject the plausible and widely accepted principle that nothing can have a determinable without having one of its determinates.

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Brian Cutter
University of Notre Dame

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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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