Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 42 (3):608-609 (1989)
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Abstract

The aim of this book is to defend compatibilism against incompatibilism by exploring the metaphysical issues that lie at the heart of the debate between them. Berofsky defines incompatibilism as the doctrine that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that particular action is not determined. Thus, regardless of the truth of determinism, that is, regardless of whether or not all events and actions are determined, the key question is: Can an agent be morally responsible for an action that is determined? Berofsky thinks the correct answer is yes, and that all arguments for incompatibilism are unsound.

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00346632

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Martin Curd
Purdue University

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