Thought, Fact, and Reference [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 35 (4):877-878 (1982)
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Abstract

In his Introduction, Hochberg writes: "Since this book is an attempt to resolve some problems about thought, truth, and reference within the tradition of Logical Atomism, readers of Bergmann and Sellars will find, not surprisingly, familiar themes." He continues a bit later: "What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore and their successors, as well as an explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a partial study of the ontology and the history of Logical Atomism." Hochberg accomplishes what he attempts. Note that he did not promise an introduction to the ontology and history of Logical Atomism. The book is intended for people who have read early Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, are familiar with some Fregean themes, who have read some secondary literature on Logical Atomism such as Urmson's or Pear's books, and who have read some of G. Bergmann's developments of Logical Atomism. Because the metaphysical analyses of several contemporary philosophers such as Quine, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, and D. Kaplan are criticized, familiarity with such writers, especially Quine, would be very helpful. Nevertheless, although the themes are familiar ones such as: realism vs. phenomenalism; realism vs. nominalism; theories of definite descriptions; coping with Bradley's regress; analyses of objects; analyses of thoughts; and although no sophisticated logic is needed to handle his formalizations, Hochberg demands almost too much concentration from even his intended readers. It is easy to get lost in the numerous alternative analyses and theories Hochberg considers. He seems unable to resist temptations to explore alternative analyses suggested to him by the one he is considering. Consequently, it is difficult to determine what are the analyses actually held by philosophers discussed, what are Hochberg's own analyses and theories, and what are serious alternatives. Because so many subtle and complicated alternatives are juggled it is difficult to uncover the main premisses of Hochberg's arguments for his resolutions. The combined insights and discipline of a seminar or reading group would be helpful in the effort to recognize the main themes and to stay with the work.

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