Quine on identity and names

Erkenntnis 10 (1):99 - 101 (1976)
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Abstract

I am concerned with two theses of quine's which pertain to identity statements and names. My purpose is to prove that they are inconsistent, I.E., That not both can be true. The two theses are: (q1) (=a) can be treated as a simple predicate, And (q2) any statement of the form (a=a) is logically true

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On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth.Matthew McKeon - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (3):205-224.
Reparsing and essentialism.W. Stephen Croddy - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (1):1-12.

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