On What it Takes to be an Expert

Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise.

Similar books and articles

The Epistemic Authority of Expertise.Robert Pierson - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:398 - 405.
Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Expertise and Experts.Matt Stichter - 2015 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 28:105-128.
"They just don't get it!" When family disagrees with expert opinion.A. Ho - 2009 - Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (8):497-501.
The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.
What is an expert?Bruce D. Weinstein - 1993 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (1).
When experts disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-08-10

Downloads
914 (#15,739)

6 months
107 (#40,216)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michel Croce
Università degli Studi di Genova

References found in this work

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

View all 30 references / Add more references