Modularity in Cognitive Models of Delusion
Abstract
Recent cognitive models of delusions have attempted to explain why delusions are commonly circumscribed, in that they tend to center on isolated beliefs, and incorrigible, as they often persist in the face of countervailing evidence. In this effort, the suggestion has been made that ‘modularity’ – a concept originating in seminal accounts of the architecture of perceptual and cognitive processes – may help explain delusions. The aim of this paper is to take up this suggestion, critically evaluating the applicability of modularity and its attendant features to the explanation of delusions. The conclusion presented here is that although a modular explanation of delusions may be relatively consistent with models that implicate dysfunctional cognitive components such as motor control and ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) systems, ultimately the application of modularity to delusions conflicts with traditional understandings of cognitive architecture and does not help provide satisfactory or sufficient explanations of delusional symptomatology.