Abstract

The contemporary debate about the relation between reasons and motivation is partly driven by the problem of explaining the “normativity” of reasons. Reasons are “prescriptive”. They direct us how to act. They are “apt” to guide our choices. Moreover, reasons are “action guiding”. Insofar as we are rational, we let them guide our choices, for we accept their instructions. These formulations are metaphorical, however, and the problem is to explain precisely what they mean. One strategy for explaining normativity, an “internalist” strategy, is to construe reasons or rationality as being necessarily connected to motivation. According to one internalist view, which is defended by Bernard Williams, appropriate motivation is entailed by reasons. This is the sense in which reasons are “apt” to guide our choices. According to another view, which is defended by Michael Smith, Christine Korsgaard, and T.M. Scanlon, motivation to act in accord with reasons is entailed by rationality. This is why we are guided by reasons insofar as we are rational. These are two familiar internalist doctrines.