Mathematical Nominalism

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022)
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Abstract

Mathematical Nominalism Mathematical nominalism can be described as the view that mathematical entities—entities such as numbers, sets, functions, and groups—do not exist. However, stating the view requires some care. Though the opposing view (that mathematical objects do exist) may seem like a somewhat exotic metaphysical claim, it is usually motivated by the thought that mathematical … Continue reading Mathematical Nominalism →

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James Collin
University of Glasgow

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